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International	Affairs	and	the	Public	Sphere	
Stephen M. Walt, Harvard University 
Most social scientists would like to believe that their profession contributes to solving pressing 
global problems. Indeed, the United States and many other modern societies subsidize 
university-based research and teaching on the assumption that scholars will develop useful 
knowledge about today’s world, communicate that knowledge to their students and to the 
broader public, and, where appropriate, offer rigorous, well-informed advice to interested 
policymakers. 
There is today no shortage of global problems that social scientists should study in depth: ethnic 
and religious conflict within and between states, the challenge of economic development, 
terrorism, the management of a fragile world economy, climate change and other forms of 
environmental degradation, the origins and impact of great power rivalries, the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction, just to mention a few. In this complex and contentious world, one 
might think that academic expertise about global affairs would be a highly valued commodity. 
Scholars would strive to produce useful knowledge, students would flock to courses that helped 
them understand the world in which they will live and work, and policymakers and the broader 
public would be eager to hear what academic experts had to say. 
One might also expect scholars of international relations to play a prominent role in public 
debates about foreign policy, along with government officials, business interests, representatives 
of special interest groups, and other concerned citizens. Social scientists are far from omniscient, 
but the rigor of the scientific process and the core values of academia should give university-
based scholars an especially valuable role within the broader public discourse on world affairs. 
At its best, academic scholarship privileges creativity, validity, accuracy, and rigor and places 
little explicit value on political expediency. The norms and procedures of the academic 
profession make it less likely that scholarly work will be tailored to fit pre-conceived political 
agendas. When this does occur, the self-correcting nature of academic research makes it more 
likely that politically motivated biases or other sources of error will be exposed. Although we 
know that scholarly communities do not always live up to this ideal picture, the existence of 
these basic norms gives the academic world some important advantages over think tanks, media 
pundits, and other knowledge-producing institutions. 
Yet the precise role that academic scholars of international affairs should play is not easy to 
specify. Indeed, there appear to be two conflicting ways of thinking about this matter. 
On the one hand, there is a widespread sense that academic research on global affairs is of 
declining practical value, either as a guide to policymakers or as part of broader public discourse 
about world affairs. Former policymakers complain that academic writing is “either irrelevant or 
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inaccessible to policy-makers. . . locked within the circle of esoteric scholarly discussion.” This 
tendency helps explain Alexander George’s recollection that policymakers’ eyes “would glaze as 
soon as I used the word theory.”[1] As Lawrence Mead noted in 2010: “Today’s political 
scientists often address very narrow questions and they are often preoccupied with method and 
past literature. Scholars are focusing more on themselves, less on the real world. . . . Research 
questions are getting smaller and data-gathering is contracting. Inquiry is becoming obscurantist 
and ingrown.”[2] 
Within the field of international affairs, this trend has led to repeated calls to “bridge the gap” 
between the ivory tower and the policy community.[3] Consistent with that aim, a number of 
prominent scholars have recently organized workshops or research projects seeking to challenge 
this “cult of irrelevance” and deprogram its adherents, although it is not clear whether these 
efforts will succeed in reversing the current drift.[4] This online symposium reflects a similar 
concern: how can the academic world contribute to a healthy public conversation about our 
collective fate, one that leads to more effective or just solutions to contemporary problems and 
helps humankind avoid major policy disasters? 
On the other hand, closer engagement with the policy world and more explicit efforts at public 
outreach are not without their own pitfalls. Scholars who enter government service or participate 
in policy debates may believe that they are “speaking truth to power,” but they run the risk of 
being corrupted or co-opted in subtle and not-so-subtle ways by the same individuals and 
institutions that they initially hoped to sway. Powerful interests are all-too-willing to use the 
prestige associated with academic scholars to advance particular policy goals, and scholars are 
hardly immune to temptations that may cloud their judgment or compromise their objectivity. 
Furthermore, scholars who embrace the role of a “public intellectual” may be tempted to 
sensationalize their findings to attract a larger audience or find themselves opining on topics on 
which they have no particular expertise. Instead of improving the quality of public discourse, 
such behavior may actually degrade it. 
The remainder of this essay explores these themes in greater detail. I begin by discussing the 
unique contributions that academic scholars could make to public discourse on world affairs—at 
least in theory—highlighting their capacity to serve as an authoritative source of knowledge 
about the world and as an independent voice in debates about contemporary issues (→Why Is 
Academic Scholarship Valuable?). I then consider why there is a growing gap between 
university-based scholars and both the policy world and the public sphere, and suggest that this 
trend is due largely to the professionalization of academic disciplines and the concomitant rise of 
a quasi-academic community of think tanks with explicit political agendas (→Why Is There a 
Gap between Academia and the Public Sphere?). Next, I identify some of the pitfalls that 
scholars face when they become more active participants in the public sphere (→The Pitfalls of 
Engagement). I conclude by proposing several reforms that could help the social sciences make a 
more vital contribution to public understanding and policy formation in the broad domain of 
global affairs (→What Is To Be Done?). 
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Why Is Academic Scholarship Valuable? 
Academics can make at least three distinct contributions to public discourse on global affairs. 
First, although the digital revolution has made a wealth of information from around the world 
accessible on a near real-time basis, most of us still lack both extensive direct data on events in 
far-flung areas and the background knowledge necessary to understand what new developments 
mean. If our town’s school district is troubled or the local economy is suffering, we can observe 
that for ourselves and make reasonably well-informed judgments about what might be done 
about it. But if the issue is the war in Afghanistan, an uprising in Yemen, a naval confrontation 
in the South China Sea or the prospects that some battered economy will be bailed out 
successfully, most of us will lack the factual knowledge or conceptual understanding to know 
what is really going on. Even when basic information is readily available, it may be hard for 
most of us to put it in the appropriate context or make sense of what it means. 
When citizens and leaders seek to grasp the dizzying complexity of modern world politics, 
therefore, they must inevitably rely upon the knowledge and insights of specialists in military 
affairs, global trade and finance, diplomatic/international historians, area experts, and many 
others. And that means relying at least in part on academic scholars who have devoted their 
careers to mastering various aspects of world affairs and whose professional stature has been 
established through the usual procedures of academic evaluation (e.g., peer review, confidential 
assessments by senior scholars, the give-and-take of scholarly debate, etc.). 
Second, and more importantly, an independent academic community is an essential 
counterweight to official efforts to shape public understanding of key foreign policy issues. 
Governments enjoy enormous information asymmetries in many areas of political life, but these 
advantages are especially pronounced when dealing with international affairs.[5] Much of what 
we know about the outside world is ultimately derived from government sources (especially 
when dealing with national security affairs), and public officials often go to considerable lengths 
to shape how that information is reported to the public. Not only do governments collect vast 
amounts of information about the outside world, but they routinely use secrecy laws to control 
public access to this information. Government officials can shape public beliefs by leaking 
information strategically, or by co-opting sympathetic journalists whose professional success 
depends in part on maintaining access to key officials.[6] Given these information asymmetries 
and their obvious interest in retaining public support for their preferred policies, it is hardly 
surprising that both democratic and non-democratic leaders use their privileged access to 
information to build support for specific policies, at times by telling outright lies to their own 
citizens.[7] 
This situation creates few problems when the policies being sold make good strategic sense, but 
the results can be disastrous when they don’t. In such cases, alternative voices are needed to 
challenge conventional wisdoms and official rationales, and to suggest different solutions to the 
problem(s) at hand. Because scholars are protected by tenure and cherish the principle of 
academic freedom, and because they are not directly dependent on government support for their 
livelihoods, they are uniquely positioned to challenge prevailing narratives and policy rationales 
and to bring their knowledge and training to bear on vital policy issues. If we believe that 
unfettered debate helps expose errors and correct missteps, thereby fostering more effective 4 
 
public policies, then a sophisticated, diverse and engaged scholarly community is essential to a 
healthy polity. 
Third, the scholarly world also offers a potentially valuable model of constructive political 
disagreement. Political discourse in many countries (and especially the United States) has 
become increasingly personal and ad hominem, with little attention paid to facts and logic; a 
trend reinforced by an increasingly competitive and loosely regulated media environment. 
Within academia, by contrast, even intense disputes are supposed to be conducted in accordance 
with established canons of logic and evidence. Ad hominem attacks and other forms of character 
assassination have no place in scholarly discourse and are more likely to discredit those who 
employ them than those who are attacked. By bringing the norms of academic discourse into the 
public sphere, academic scholars could help restore some of the civility that has been lost in 
recent years. 
For all of these reasons, it is highly desirable for university-based scholars to play a significant 
role in public discourse about key real-world issues and to engage directly with policymakers 
where appropriate. As I have argued elsewhere, academic research can provide policymakers 
with relevant factual knowledge, provide typologies and frameworks that help policymakers and 
citizens make sense of emerging trends, and create and test theories that leaders can use to 
choose among different policy instruments. Academic theories can also be useful when they help 
policymakers anticipate events, when they identify recurring tendencies or obstacles to success, 
and when they facilitate the formulation of policy alternatives and the identification of 
benchmarks that can guide policy evaluation. Because academic scholars are free from daily 
responsibility for managing public affairs, they are in an ideal position to develop new concepts 
and theories to help us understand a complex and changing world.[8] 
The picture sketched here is obviously something of an ideal type, and I am not suggesting that 
that the academic world consistently lives up to these expectations. As noted above, university-
based scholars of international affairs—and especially the disciplines of political science and 
history—have increasingly focused on narrow and arcane topics and are contributing less and 
less to policy formation or public discourse.[9] And when academics do address topics of 
obvious policy relevance or public interest, the results are often presented in impenetrable, 
jargon-ridden prose and disseminated in venues that neither policymakers nor the public are 
likely to read. Even when scholars have something useful to say, in short, their tendency to 
“speaking in tongues” diminishes their impact on the public sphere. 
Why Is There a Gap between Academia and the Public Sphere? 
 To some degree, the gap between the ivory tower and the world of policy arises because the two 
spheres have different agendas and operate under different incentives and constraints. Academics 
focus on developing generalizations and testing conjectures as rigorously as possible, while 
policymakers and the public are often preoccupied with individual cases (i.e., whatever is in the 
headlines or in a policymaker’s in-tray). Thus, scholars are delighted whenever they identify a 
powerful general tendency, but policymakers may be more interested in figuring out how to 
overcome that general tendency or worried that the case at hand might be an exception to it. 
Academics strive to make their work as accurate as possible, even if this takes more time, but 
policymakers cannot always wait until a complete analysis is possible.[10] To take a recent 5 
 
example, policymakers in the Obama administration had to respond to the 2011 “Arab Spring” 
long before anyone fully understood what was driving these events or where they might lead. 
Given these different agendas, it is not surprising that policymakers often find academic 
scholarship to be of less value than the scholars who produce it might wish. 
Yet the growing gap between theory and practice and the declining role of scholars in the public 
sphere also reflects the professionalization of academic disciplines and the norms and incentives 
that prevail in the scholarly world. In particular, the academic disciplines that are most concerned 
with global affairs (political science/international relations, history, economics, sociology, 
anthropology/area studies, etc.) are largely governed by university-based scholars who have little 
if any experience in the policy world. With rare exceptions, policymakers, policy analysts, or 
public intellectuals do not play significant roles in the governance of academic disciplines, 
leaving the latter free to set their own norms and criteria of merit. Not surprisingly, scholarly 
disciplines have come to privilege highly specialized research (as opposed to teaching, public 
service, or public engagement) because that is what most members of these fields prefer to do. 
Yet this was not always the case. In the distant past, thinkers such as Machiavelli, Locke, 
Hobbes, Madison, Marx or Burke were engaged in and inspired by the political events of their 
day and their writings were explicitly intended to shape public attitudes and inform elite conduct. 
During the Progressive Era, the founders of modern political science in the United States 
consciously intended the knowledge they generated to improve the world, and the creation of 
organizations like the American Political Science Association was intended in part to enhance 
the public role of political science knowledge. Not so long ago, it was not uncommon for leading 
scholars of global affairs to work in policy-making circles before returning to active intellectual 
careers or to write for both academic audiences and the broader public.[11] 
By contrast, the norms and incentives of contemporary academic life discourage scholars from 
active participation in the public sphere or from doing work that is directly relevant to pressing 
global issues and accessible to influential decision-makers.[12] In the vast majority of cases, 
promotion to tenure and eligibility for lucrative “outside offers” from competitor universities 
depends on a scholar’s reputation among his or her professional peers, and not on their public 
profile or their contributions to real-world debates. As a result, most scholars of global affairs do 
not try to write books or articles that would be directly relevant to policy problems or accessible 
to a wider public audience. Although a few “in-and-outers” still exist, they are for the most part 
not drawn from the very top of the disciplinary hierarchy.[13] Younger scholars are cautioned 
not to “waste” their time publishing op-eds, weblogs, or articles in general readership journals. 
Scholars who write for Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, or even rigorously peer-reviewed 
journals such as International Security are sometimes dismissed as insufficiently rigorous, based 
on arbitrary and dubious notions of what constitutes “genuine” scholarship.”[14] 
Professionalization also encourages scholars to employ specialized jargon and arcane 
methodological techniques, because these devices reinforce the idea that members of the 
discipline are privy to specialized knowledge that non-members lack. At worst, a trivial result 
that relies on the latest methodological fad will be judged superior to a bolder, more 
counterintuitive, or potentially more fruitful argument that is presented in clear and easy-to-
understand prose. More advanced methods or techniques are preferable when they yield superior 6 
 
results, of course, but methodological sophistication alone tells us relatively little about the value 
or the insights embodied in a particular work. 
In fact, there is no great mystery as to what makes a piece of scholarship valuable. First, does it 
address an important question? Second, does it offer a creative or original answer, one that 
substantially alters our prior understanding of the phenomenon under study? Third, are its 
empirical claims valid and convincing? Finally, is it presented as clearly and accessibly as 
possible, so that it can reach the largest possible audience (including the largest number of 
potential critics)?[15] Each of these qualities is important, and privileging methodological 
sophistication over the others is a hallmark of a “professionalized” discipline that, as a 
consequence, maximizes its autonomy, insulates itself from public scrutiny, and reinforces the 
belief that its members possess specialized knowledge that is available only to them. At the most 
extreme, hyper-professionalized disciplines are like a guild of silversmiths whose members are 
judged solely on the purity of the metal in their objects, and not on whether the items they made 
were useful, durable, or attractive. A similarly one-dimensional approach to scholarship 
inevitably widens the gap between the ivory tower, the policy world, and the public sphere. 
Professionalization also discourages academic scholars from addressing controversial topics or 
challenging well-established taboos. Although university scholars are quick to defend the 
institution of tenure and the principle of academic freedom, in most cases this commitment has 
more to do with a desire for lifetime sinecures than a commitment to using these protections to 
take on politically controversial topics. Smart young scholars know that being too controversial 
can annoy potential donors, alarm deans and department chairs, and alienate senior colleagues, 
thereby undermining prospects for promotion or later advancement. Focusing one’s efforts on 
narrow and uncontroversial topics that are of interest only to one’s fellow academicians is by far 
the safer route to the Holy Grail of lifetime employment. Given this incentive structure, it is 
hardly surprising that academic engagement in the public sphere and the policy world is 
declining. 
Last but not least, the “cult of irrelevance” in academe is probably related to the concomitant 
emergence of independent think tanks. Although such organizations increasingly mimic the 
academic world (e.g., by appointing fellows to “endowed chairs” to convey a quasi-academic 
image and aid fund-raising efforts), the two realms are quite different. Not only do most think 
tanks exist in order to advance an explicit political agenda, but researchers at these organizations 
are often dependent on “soft money” and do not enjoy the full protections of tenure. They have 
become increasingly influential in recent years in part because of their proximity to centers of 
power like Washington, New York, and London, but also because they work much harder than 
universities do at wielding influence in the policy world. And although think tanks like the 
RAND Corporation and the Brookings Institution once performed research that was as rigorous 
and influential as most academic scholarship, this is no longer the case. To the extent that think 
tanks also provide sinecures for once-and-future policymakers when their party is out of power, 
then these organizations will be even less likely to produce research or commentary that 
challenges the prevailing “Establishment” consensus. 
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The Pitfalls of Engagement 
 Yet a more intimate connection between scholars, policymakers, and the broader public carries 
its own pitfalls as well. For starters, academics aspiring to hold government positions may be 
even less likely to tackle controversial topics or take unpopular positions, because doing so 
might jeopardize their chances for a future appointment. Indeed, because political appointees are 
chosen primarily for their loyalty and ideological compatibility and not for scholarly 
accomplishment, academics who seek direct policy jobs are bound to tailor their work to suit 
those who might appoint them (or in the United States, to appease the Senators who will vote to 
confirm their appointments). This tendency does not mean that scholars will say things they 
don’t believe merely to get a job in government, but it would be naïve to think that this concern 
never influences what an ambitious scholar would be willing to say in public. 
Greater engagement can lead to other conflicts of interest as well. In particular, academics 
working on important aspects of global affairs may enjoy lucrative opportunities to do outside 
consulting, often at the behest of wealthy or well-funded interests. National security experts are 
sometimes hired to consult for the Department of Defense or a major defense contractor, for 
example, or an economist might consult for banks, hedge funds or private corporations. Different 
government agencies also hire consultants and sponsor academic research projects, which may 
tempt recipients to tailor their work to fit the agency’s preferences or to refrain from publishing 
results that might be embarrassing to the funder.[16] 
If relationships like these are not publicly disclosed, it is hard to know whether a scholar’s views 
on a given issue reflects a genuine scholarly conclusion or whether it is at least partly influenced 
by financial or other professional incentives. At the very least, consumers of a scholar’s work 
should be informed about these arrangements so that they can take obvious conflicts of interest 
into account. 
Even when money is not at issue, closer engagement with the real world creates other sources of 
potential bias. Scholars are only human, after all, and they are hardly immune from seduction by 
powerful interests or individuals. Being asked to advise the Secretary of State, to participate in a 
Defense Department junket to Afghanistan or Iraq, or to serve on a government task force can be 
a heady experience, and scholars may also regard such service as a patriotic duty. But academics 
that enjoy hobnobbing with public officials or powerful private interests may become reluctant to 
do or say anything that might jeopardize their insider status. Instead of “speaking truth to 
power,” in short, academics can easily slide into telling the powerful what they want to hear, or 
at least confining their comments to what they think is the “acceptable” range of opinion. 
There is even a potential downside when academics become “public intellectuals.” On the one 
hand, scholarly engagement in the public sphere increases public awareness of key issues and 
foster a more informed and responsible citizenry. There may also be a link between public 
engagement and more effective teaching: the same skills that help academics explain complex 
ideas to untrained students can make them more effective at informing the public (and vice 
versa). Writing op-eds, blogs, popular books, and articles is also a way to fulfill academia’s 
broader responsibility to help society address important public problems, instead of engaging 
mostly in a self-serving internal dialogue among specialists. 8 
 
The danger, however, is that a craving for public attention (not to mention book sales, speakers’ 
fees, and other rewards) will encourage some scholars to cast off academic rigor entirely and 
court notoriety for notoriety’s sake. It can also encourage scholars to opine on topics that are far 
from our established areas of expertise and where we have no special insight or wisdom to 
impart. 
While there is an obvious problem with the “cult of irrelevance,” in short, there is also a danger 
that academic scholars can become little more than hired guns; handmaidens to powerful 
interests instead of pursuers and proclaimers of truth. And if that happens, then academia’s 
unique ability to serve as an independent and critical source of authoritative knowledge will be 
impaired. In short, no matter how much we may want academics to be more fully engaged in the 
public sphere, we should also acknowledge that it is hard to have the best of both worlds.[17] 
What Is To Be Done? 
 As scholars, therefore, our challenge is to chart a course between the Scylla of hyper-
professionalized irrelevance and the Charybdis of corrupt opportunism. We should begin by 
recognizing that the norms and incentives that guide the scholarly enterprise are neither divinely 
ordained nor fixed in stone; like all norms, they are “socially constructed” by the academic 
community itself and by the outside stakeholders who have an interest in what the academy 
produces. Members of academic disciplines are free to debate and determine which norms and 
incentives should guide our enterprise and to modify them as experience suggests. There is no 
objective reason why greater engagement in the public sphere cannot be elevated in our 
collective estimation, along with the other criteria (rigor, originality, empirical validity, etc.) that 
scholars have traditionally (and correctly) prized. 
If consensus on these norms proves elusive, then different universities or departments could 
adopt different criteria of merit and evolve in different directions. To some extent this may 
already be occurring, as schools of public policy begin to occupy the policy-relevant space 
abandoned by hyper-professionalized arts and sciences departments. Indeed, greater 
disagreement about the norms used to judge academic work might even be desirable, because a 
heterogeneous intellectual community working on these issues is probably preferable to a 
monoculture where a single method, theoretical perspective or political orientation 
predominates.[18] Even the best social science theories are highly imperfect, and once-popular 
ideas and approaches are often exposed as hollow with the passage of time. When dealing with 
vital yet contentious issues (i.e., the sorts of topics that routinely arise in world affairs), we will 
be better off nurturing a diverse intellectual ecosystem instead of placing all our bets on a single 
way of trying to grasp something as complex and contingent as international affairs. 
The bottom line is clear: the academic study of international affairs will be impoverished if the 
relevant academic disciplines continue to turn inward, to focus on narrow issues that are 
primarily of interest only to other scholars, and to become even less interested in communicating 
to policymakers, the broader public, or the bulk of our students (the vast majority of whom do 
not want to be social scientists themselves). Accordingly, our goal should be to encourage a 
diverse, engaged community of scholars that is still committed to a free exchange of ideas and to 
high standards of both rigor and relevance. 9 
 
What can be done to advance this goal? Here are six steps that would encourage greater 
academic engagement in the public sphere without sacrificing a commitment to high scholarly 
standards.  
1. Give Greater Weight to Real World Impact when Evaluating Individual Scholars and 
Academic Departments 
First, and most obviously, academic departments could give greater weight to policy relevance 
and public impact in hiring and promotion decisions. Instead of focusing almost entirely on peer-
reviewed professional journals and/or monographs by university presses, for example, promotion 
review committees could also do a systematic evaluation of a candidate’s other contributions to 
knowledge and public discourse, including weblogs, popular journals, trade books, or other 
professional studies (such as National Academy of Science proceedings). As Bruce Jentleson 
noted a decade ago, “Should it really be the case that a book with a major university press and an 
article or two in a [refereed] journal . . . can almost seal the deal for tenure, but books with even 
major commercial houses count so much less and articles in journals such as Foreign Affairs 
count little if at all? . . . The argument is not about padding publication counts with op-eds and 
other such commentaries, but it is to broaden evaluative criteria to better reflect the type and 
range of writing of intellectual import.”[19] Jentleson is surely right; it is the substance of a 
scholar’s work that should count, not where it happens to have been published. 
This shift might be facilitated by another innovation, which was recently discussed among 
participants in the “Perestroika” movement in political science. What if junior faculty were told 
at the time they were hired that they would be permitted to submit no more than five scholarly 
works when being considered for promotion to tenure? Instead of encouraging younger scholars 
to churn out as many publications as possible (most of which will not even be read by most of 
the colleagues who will eventually vote on their case), this procedure would encourage scholars 
to publish fewer works of higher quality and to aim for greater overall impact. As Lenin put it in 
another context, “better fewer, but better.” This norm would also make it easier for outside 
referees and senior colleagues to read these works in depth and to judge them on their merits, 
instead of using the alleged prestige of the the journal or press as a proxy for a publication’s 
intellectual merit. 
Similarly, instead of focusing primarily on sheer quantity of academic publications or imperfect 
measures like citation counts, review committees could be asked to perform a more systematic 
evaluation of a scholar’s impact on public discourse or policy debate.[20] In addition to 
academic citation counts, for example, a review committee could also track the number of news 
reports or blog hits that discussed a candidate’s work, or examine citations in both academic and 
non-academic journals. Similarly, in addition to obtaining the usual outside letters from senior 
scholars, review committees could also solicit evaluations from policymakers working in the 
same domain as the candidate’s primary work. Non-academic appraisals must be used with 
caution, of course, as outsiders may be unfamiliar with academic standards or inclined to favor 
only those works that agreed with their political views. And they are certainly no substitute for 
the confidential appraisals offered by senior scholars. But if an academic department cared about 
having a faculty that made positive contributions to the broader public sphere, then surely it 
would want to know if a junior scholar working on a topic like ethnic conflict or nuclear 10 
 
proliferation was being read by important members of the relevant policy community or if their 
work was helping shape how people outside academia thought and talked about these issues. 
A similar principle could also be applied to the evaluation of entire departments. External review 
committees should contain obviously scholars from the relevant discipline, but they could 
include people drawn from outside academia as well. Instead of focusing on the deeply-flawed 
rankings provided by U.S. News and World Report or the National Research Council, new efforts 
could be made to devise evaluative methodologies that were not stacked in favor of certain types 
of work.[21] Ranking indexes could also measure and incorporate on a department’s 
contributions outside the academy. University presidents, provosts, and deans could start holding 
departments accountable to a broader conception of merit as well, by stressing not just narrow 
technical excellence but also the substantive importance of the faculty’s work and the 
contributions it had made to public understanding of them. 
2. Encourage Professional Associations to Honor Public Impact 
Professional associations could encourage greater involvement in the public sphere by doing 
more to acknowledge and valorize it. Consider that the American Political Science Association 
gives literally dozens of annual awards for books, papers or articles in the various sub and sub-
sub-fields of the discipline, judged almost entirely on a prize jury’s assessment of scholarly 
merit. It gives one award (the Hubert H. Humphrey Award) “in recognition of notable public 
service by a political scientist,” and one other award (the Charles Merriam Award) for “a person 
whose published work and career represent a significant contribution to the art of government.” 
In short, real-world relevance is germane to only two of the dozens of APSA prizes awarded 
each year. If we want scholars to devote more time to engaging in the public sphere, reducing 
this imbalance by making real-world impact or relevance an explicit criterion for the existing 
awards would almost certainly help, as would the creation of more prizes intended to honor 
scholars whose work or careers are judged to have had a positive impact on the public sphere 
itself. 
3. Encourage Younger Scholars to Participate in Policy-Related Activities 
Academic departments could encourage greater involvement in the public sphere by making it 
easier for younger scholars to engage in it, either on their own or through programs like the 
International Affairs Fellowships sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations.[22] At present, 
few academic departments encourage junior scholars to take time off for public service, and few 
universities will stop the tenure clock if a junior faculty member wants to spend a year serving in 
government or at a non-governmental organization such as Human Rights Watch, the United 
Nations, or the World Bank. If they enabled younger faculty to stop the clock in this way, 
however, academic departments would have more members who understood how governments 
and key global organizations actually worked, and they would become more adept at translating 
scholarly research into useful knowledge for their students and practical guidance for 
policymakers and the public at large. Such individuals would probably be better teachers as well, 
because students, unlike many professional academics, really do care about the real world and 
have little tolerance for empty scholasticism. 
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4. Engage Policymakers and Knowledgeable Citizens in the Research Process 
As Craig Calhoun suggests in his own contribution to this symposium, the scholarly world 
should do more to engage policymakers and other non-academic experts in the research process 
itself, instead of seeing them solely as objects of study. We expect today’s graduate students to 
master an elaborate methodological toolkit and to be familiar with an ever-expanding academic 
literature, but we rarely encourage them to interact with the policy communities whose decisions 
and actions they are studying and rarely give them explicit training on how to “soak and poke” 
among policy elites. Not surprisingly, therefore, younger scholars are often content to manipulate 
data sets or to write detailed case studies, but without engaging in any depth with the 
policymakers working in the relevant domain. 
Furthermore, if academic scholars made a practice of asking practitioners what topics or 
questions might be most interesting or useful, the benefits for both communities might be 
considerable. For instance, what if people with real-world experience were regarded not just as 
potential consumers of scholarship or as data points in a survey, but as a source of guidance 
about scholarly research agendas, methods, and modes of presentation? Instead of deriving 
dissertation topics or research ideas primarily from lacunae in the academic literature, we could 
also ask policymakers what sorts of knowledge they would most like to have, or what recurring 
puzzles merit extended scholarly attention. Among other things, outside experts are more likely 
to ask “so what?” when confronted by an elegant and well-crafted study addressing a question 
that is of interest to hardly anyone. 
In the same spirit, we could also encourage students to plumb real-world policy debates in order 
to identify underlying theoretical or empirical disputes that drive policy disagreements. 
Obviously, scholars should still develop their own research agendas and not take their marching 
orders from non-academics blindly, but more extensive dialogue between the worlds of theory 
and of practice at the initial stages of a research project could improve the overall quality of the 
research itself and make it more likely that policymakers would pay attention to the results. 
5. Convince University Administrators to Value Participation in the Public Sphere 
Presidents, provosts and deans can facilitate these adjustments by allocating greater resources to 
departments and programs that are producing socially useful knowledge and making more 
substantial contributions to the broader public sphere. To be sure, university administrators are 
often pleased whenever some member of their faculty gains broad attention—though somewhat 
less so when their work is controversial—but few of them encourage faculty or departments to 
raise their public profile or give them clear incentives to do so. 
Another way to increase the public impact of universities, as Rogers Smith points out in his own 
essay in this symposium, is to place greater emphasis on the traditional role of teaching. 
Effective teaching is one of our responsibilities as scholars and student interest is one way to 
gauge whether a department’s activities are broadly relevant to contemporary issues. University 
administrators should place greater weight on this contribution, and allocate greater resources to 
departments, programs and schools that perform well on this dimension. 12 
 
The reforms sketched here are not intended to transform today’s academy into a community of 
headline-chasing policy analysts competing to win the attention of government officials, an army 
of spell-binding orators catering to hordes of fawning undergraduates, or a cadre of public 
intellectuals focused more on launching best-sellers and hitting the talk-show circuit than on 
conducting path-breaking original scholarship. Rather, the goal is to foster a more heterogeneous 
community at all levels of academe, based on the recognition that scholars can contribute to a 
vibrant and constructive public sphere in many different ways, including some that have little to 
do with publication in peer-reviewed disciplinary journals. 
6. Broaden the Discussion of Academic Ethics and Responsibilities 
Scholars who study global affairs also need to have a long-overdue discussion about the broader 
ethical responsibilities of our profession. To the extent that professional training in the social 
sciences deals with ethical issues at all, the focus is usually confined to questions of academic 
fraud, academic freedom, the treatment of human subjects, or potential abuses of power (such as 
sexual harassment). As scholars, we rarely talk about the larger purpose of our profession, the 
broader social role we supposedly fulfill, or how we should meet our larger obligations to the 
society that supports us. Whatever their other flaws may be, the legal and medical professions 
are clear about what their central purpose is, and they incorporate discussions of ethics and social 
purpose into the training of new doctors and lawyers. By contrast, social scientists rarely discuss 
their public responsibilities and this topic plays little or no role in graduate training in most 
academic departments.[23] If it did, it might raise some awkward but useful questions about 
whether our profession exists largely for our entertainment and livelihoods, or whether society 
has a right to expect something more. 
A related issue is how scholars should deal with potential conflicts of interest, and especially 
where significant sums of money are involved. Virtually all universities permit their faculty to do 
some amount of outside consulting, but there is no agreed-upon standard for how scholars can 
preserve their integrity and their reputations as objective experts when they are also being 
compensated (and in some cases, quite generously) for related professional work. Nor is this just 
a concern for the individuals who are doing this work, because conflicts of interests, once 
exposed, can affect the reputation of an entire department or university and cast a shadow on the 
entire profession. Were the public (or key legislators) to begin seeing the social sciences as little 
more than hired guns, they will be even less likely to take our work seriously or to give 
universities the resources they need to remain vibrant and independent. 
Fortunately, transparency provides a simple solution to this problem. Individual scholars should 
remain free to do whatever outside work they wish (subject to the regulations of their particular 
university), provided that they disclose such relationships publicly, including the actual level of 
compensation involved. For example, universities could require scholars who do outside 
consulting for pay to report this information on a public website, identifying sources of outside 
income within broad bands (e.g., $0-999, $1000-4999, $5,000-9,999, $10,000 and higher, etc.). 
Academics would still be free to write whatever they wished in both scholarly and non academic 
venues, but consumers of their various writings could decide whether to discount the conclusions 
or not. Such a procedure would not infringe on individual or academic freedom, but it would 
ensure that consumers of academic scholarship on vital topics would be aware of potential 
sources of bias. Such a norm might also have a valuable deterrent effect: if an individual scholar 13 
 
was tempted to accept compensation but reluctant to have the relationship made public, it is 
probably a revealing sign that the relationship itself is inappropriate. 
Conclusion 
 Is this vision of a more engaged, diverse, rigorous-but-still-relevant, and fiercely independent 
social science a pipe dream? Perhaps, if academic departments continue to privilege narrow 
disciplinary orthodoxy instead of embracing a conception of scholarly merit that also includes 
relevance, accessibility, theoretical fertility, and public impact. If scholars working on global 
affairs are content with having little to say to their fellow citizens and public officials and little to 
contribute to solving public problems, then we can expect even less attention and fewer 
resources over time (and to be frank, we won’t deserve either). By contrast, if the academic 
community decides to use its privileged position and professional expertise to address an 
overcrowded global agenda in a useful way, then it will have taken a large step toward fulfilling 
its true social purpose. Therein lies the good news: the fate of the social sciences is largely in our 
own hands. 
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